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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
vs. : 
: Case No. 20030263-CA 
ANDREW LUCERO, 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of three counts of Distribution of 
a Controlled Substance and two counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance 
with the Intent to Distribute. Three of the counts are first-degree felonies. The 
other two are second-degree felonies. The Defendant was found guilty by a 
jury on August 20, 2002 and was sentenced on December 11, 2002. This Court 
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under the pour over provision in U.C.A. 
§78-2a-3(j). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE 
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS PRIOR 
CONVICTIONS? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue should be reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard of review. "When reviewing a trial court's decision 
to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), we apply an abuse of discretion 
standard." State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001). In addition, this 
court should "review the record to determine whether the admission of 
[prior] bad acts evidence was 'scrupulously examined' by the trial judge 'in 
the proper exercise of that discretion.'" State v. Nelson-Wagonner, 6 P.3d 
1120 (Utah 2000)(citations omitted). 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT FOUND THAT 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
SUPPORT THE SEARCH WARRANT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court should "examine the search 
warrant affidavit in its entirety and in a common-sense fashion, deferring to 
the magistrate's decision on whether the search warrant is supported by 
probable cause." State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992)(citations and quotations omitted). 
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW 
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY TO CROSS EXAMINE 
THE STATE'S WITNESS CONCERNING A 
SPECIFIC INCIDENT OF UNTRUTHFULNESS? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine whether 
the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow defense counsel 
to cross-examine the State's witness about specific instances of 
untruthfulness under Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. "[T]he trial 
court has broad discretion in restricting the scope of cross-examination, and 
on appeal the trial court's ruling [regarding the scope of cross-examination] 
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Gomez,63 P.3d 
72 (Utah 2002)(quotations omitted)(brackets in original). 
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue should be analyzed under an abuse 
of discretion standard of review. However, the legal determinations made 
by the trial court as a basis for its decision should be reviewed for 
correctness. "[W]e will not reverse a trial court's decision [to grant or deny 
a new trial] absent a clear abuse of . . . discretion, but [a]ny legal 
determinations made by the trial court as a basis for its denial of a new trial 
motion are reviewed for correctness." State v. Pritchett, 69 P.3d 1278, 1282 
(Utah 2003)(Citations and quotations omitted)(brackets in original) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(e). Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 24 - Motion for new trial, (a) the court may, upon motion of a party or 
upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any 
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a 
party, (b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. 
The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential 
facts in support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure 
affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for 
such time as it deems reasonable, (c) A motion for a new trial shall be made 
within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such further tiem as the 
curt may fix during the ten-day period, (d) If a new trial is granted, the party 
shall be in the same position as if no trial had been held and the former verdict 
shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or argument. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 403- Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion or 
waste of time. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404(b) other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
Rule 608(b)- Evidence of character and conduct of witness -Specific instances 
of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime 
as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, 
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) 
concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) 
concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness 
as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. 
A 
Rule 609(a)(1) &(2)- Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime-
evidence that a witness other than th accused has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law which the witness was 
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime 
shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
Evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by information with three counts of 
distributing a controlled substance and two counts of possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute. (R. 001-002). The Defendant was 
originally charged with three second degree felonies and two third degree 
felonies. The information was later amended. The amended information 
included an enhancement based on the Defendant's prior drug conviction. (R. 
064-065). Under the amended information the Defendant was charged with 
three first degree felonies and two second degree felonies. The Defendant was 
convicted of all charges under the amended information. (R. 392-94). The 
Defendant was sentenced to three terms of five years to life at the Utah State 
Prison and two terms of one to fifteen years at the prison. The sentences on the 
first degree felonies were ordered to run concurrent to each other but 
consecutive to the second degree felonies, which were to run concurrent with 
each other. R. 394). 
<; 
Prior to the trial, on March 21, 2002, the State filed a motion in limine 
requesting that it be allowed to admit the defendant's prior bad acts into 
evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Specifically, the 
State wanted to introduce evidence of the Defendant's convictions for similar 
offenses that occurred in 1992. (R. 109-118). 
Defendant's attorney responded by filing a document titled "motion to 
dismiss, renewed motion for bill of particulars, motion to suppress and 
memorandum in support thereof, as well as, in opposition to State's motion in 
limine." (R. 122-136). In this document, Defendant asked the trial court to 
suppress all evidence that was found as a result of a search warrant that was 
executed on his girlfriend's apartment. The document also asked the trial court 
to deny the State's motion to use his prior bad acts at trial. The State 
responded by filing an objection to the motion to suppress. (R. 159-67). 
There was a hearing on April 22, 2002 where the State's Motion in 
Limine was argued. During the hearing the State argued that they wanted to 
use the Defendant's prior convictions as part of their case in chief because it 
showed the Defendant's intent. (R. 484/40-42. R. 173-74). The trial court 
found that the Defendant's prior convictions were admissible. The court based 
this ruling on State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), and State v. 
Ramirez 924 P.2d 366, (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
On June 5, 2002, Defendant's attorney filed a motion and accompanying 
memorandum to quash the search warrant and to suppress the evidence that 
was obtained from the subsequent search. (R. 181-191). On June 11, 2002, the 
State responded with a written objection to Defendant's motion to suppress. 
(R. 200-08). There was a hearing on this motion on July 105 2002. The trial 
court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. (R. 213-214, R. 490/31-32). 
On July 31, 2002, the State filed a second motion in limine (R. 240-42). 
This motion in limine requested that the Court prohibit Defendant's attorney 
from inquiring into the confidential informant's criminal record on cross-
examination. This motion was granted and the Defendant was prohibited from 
cross-examining the State's main witness about an incident where he stole 
from his employer and then lied about it. (R. 493/276-285) 
A jury trial was held on August 15, 16, 19, and 20, 2002. The Defendant 
was convicted on all charges. (R. 368-72). Sentencing was originally 
scheduled for September 18, 2002. It was continued four times and Defendant 
was eventually sentenced on December 11, 2002. (R. 389-392). On December 
18, 2002, Defendant's attorney filed a motion for an extension of time to file a 
motion for a new trial. (R. 395-97). The State objected to an extension. (R. 
398-99). On December 20, 2002, the trial court granted an extension until 
December 30, 2002. (R. 403). 
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Defendant's attorney filed a motion for a new trial on December 30, 
2002. (R. 407-418). The State filed a memorandum in opposition to 
Defendant's motion for a new trial on January 16, 2003. (R. 419-434). A 
hearing was held on the motion for a new trial on January 29, 2003. (R. 499/2-
5). The motion for a new trial was denied. The findings of fact and 
conclusions of law denying the motion for a new trial were signed by the trial 
judge on February 18, 2003. (R. 505-507) On February 12, 2003, Defendant's 
trial counsel was allowed to withdraw from the case. ( R. 440-41). On March 
14, 2003, Defendant filed a pro se motion requesting additional time to file an 
appeal. (R. 442). On March 21, 2003, Defendant filed a pro se notice of 
appeal (R. 444). He also filed a request for court appointed counsel on this 
same date. (R. 447). On May 13, 2003, the Public Defender's Association was 
appointed to represent Defendant on his appeal. (R. 471). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Russ Hartley ("Hartley") was a former drug user and friend of the 
Defendant. (R. 493/161-63). He contacted Kim Allen from Adult Parole and 
Probation about turning the Defendant in for selling drugs. (R. 493/164-65). 
Mr. Allen arranged a meeting with Agent Machielson of the Weber Morgan 
Narcotic Strike Force ("Strike Force"). (R. 493/165). Hartley began working 
as a confidential informant ("C.I.")- (R- 493/166). He assisted the strike force 
on four different cases and was paid approximately three thousand dollars 
($3000) for the work he did with the strike force. (R. 493/166-67). 
Russ Hartley testified that he began working with the strike force in 
January of 2001. (R. 493/165-66). He testified that he had been a user of 
controlled substances in the past but he quit on November 11 2000 and that he 
was not using in January of 2001 when he began working with the strike force. 
(R. 493/168, 207-08). Hartley also testified that "I was just smoking a lot of 
weed . . ." Id. On cross examination, Hartley testified "that's all I did was 
marijuana..." (R. 493/211). 
On February 9, 2001, Hartley met with Agent Machielson at the 
Cherrywood Condominiums in Ogden, which is where Defendant resided with 
his girlfriend. (R. 493/169-71). Hartley called Defendant on the phone and 
told him he wanted some green board which was the code word for marijuana. 
(R. 493/173). Hartley was given one hundred dollars of strike force money. 
He also had a wire on him which allowed the strike force officers to monitor 
the conversations between Hartley and Defendant. He walked over to the 
Defendant's residence and knocked on the door. Id. He was allowed inside 
and the Defendant got out his scales and weighed out a hundred dollars worth 
of marijuana. (R. 493/174). 
The Defendant allegedly showed Hartley some methamphetamine and 
asked Hartley if he wanted to try some. Hartley testified that he told Defendant 
"you know I don't like that stuff." The Defendant then consumed 
methamphetamine in front of Hartley. (R. 493/175). Hartley met Agent 
Machielson back at the clubhouse and gave him the marijuana. (R. 493/175-
76). 
On February 27, 2001, Hartley made a second controlled buy from the 
Defendant. (R. 493/176). On this occasion, Lucero called Defendant and 
ordered a yard of sheetrock which is code for methamphetamine. (R. 493/176). 
Hartley went to the Defendant's residence and purchased a hundred dollars 
worth of methamphetamine. (R. 493/176-77). 
On March 5, 2001, Hartley made a third buy from the Defendant. The 
same procedures were followed. Hartley purchased a hundred dollars worth of 
methamphetamine from Defendant. (R. 493/179-180). 
Hartley testified that he had subsequent conversations with Defendant 
where Defendant accused him of being a snitch and threatened to kill him. 
Defendant also left threatening messages on Hartley's phone. (R. 493/183-
185). 
After Hartley's third buy, he told Agent Machielson that there was a 
substantial amount of methamphetamine and marijuana in Defendant's home. 
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(R. 494/118). Agent Machielson prepared an affidavit for a search warrant of 
the condominium located at 1120 Canyon road #2 in Ogden, Utah. The 
Honorable Stanton Taylor authorized a search warrant. (R. 494/119). The 
warrant was executed on March 6, 2001. Id. 
Officers found $1,450 in cash under a mattress. (R. 494/126). 
Defendant told the officers that this money came from his business. (R. 
494/126-27). Included in this money was a hundred dollar bill that Agent 
Machielson had given to Russ Hartley to purchase methamphetamine with. (R. 
494/127-130). Agent Machielson found some methamphetamine inside the lid 
of a can of spray paint. (R. 494/139-40). Agent Machielson could not find any 
other controlled substances so he called Russ Hartley. (R. 494/141). Hartley 
directed him to a closet near the washer and dryer. Machielson found an army 
style duffle bag that contained marijuana. (R. 494/141-42). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial was violated. There 
were several instances where the trial court abused its discretion either by 
allowing the State to introduce prejudicial evidence against the Defendant or 
by limiting the evidence the Defendant could present on his behalf. 
The first error was when the trial court allowed the State to introduce 
evidence of the Defendant's prior conviction for the same offense. These 
u 
convictions were over eight (8) years old and were not used for a non-character 
purpose. Furthermore, the Court failed to do a Rule 403 analysis to determine 
whether the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value. 
The Defendant was also prejudiced by the evidence that was admitted 
following a search based on a faulty affidavit for the search warrant. The 
affidavit for the search warrant contained information indicating that 
Defendant was a suspect in a case that the officer knew was not true. The 
affidavit also stated that the confidential informant had been working with the 
Strike Force for several years. The affidavit failed to mention that the 
confidential informant was receiving money for the information he provided. 
Based on the misleading and omitted information, the trial court should have 
suppressed the evidence that was found pursuant to the execution of said 
warrant. 
The Defendant was also prejudiced when the trial court prohibited his 
attorneys from cross-examining the State's main witness concerning specific 
instances of untruthfulness. The trial court applied Rule of Evidence 609 to 
Rule 608 and did not do a Rule 403 analysis. The Defendant was prejudiced 
when he was not able to attack the confidential informant's credibility under 
Rule 608. 
The final error was when the trial court denied Defendant's motion for a 
new trial. Following the trial the Defendant learned that Russ Hartley, who 
was the State's confidential informant and main witness, had testified falsely 
under oath. Mr. Hartley had testified in another case that he used cocaine until 
December 2000. At Defendant's trial Mr. Hartley testified that he only used 
marijuana and that he quit using it on November 11, 2001. Both the prosecutor 
and the police officer were present at both hearings and either knew or should 
have known that Mr. Hartley testified falsely about these matters. Had this 
information been brought to Defendant's attention, Russ Hartley's credibility 
would have been attacked and his testimony would have carried less weight. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE 
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
CONVICTIONS FROM 1993. 
Prior to the trial, the State filed a written motion in limine requesting 
permission to present to the jury evidence that the Defendant had been 
convicted of a similar crime in the past. (R. 109). Defendant objected to the 
State's motion. (See, R. 122). A hearing was held on April 22, 2002. 
The State argued that the prior conviction was admissible to show intent. 
(R. 484/41). The State also argued that the circumstances between the prior 
convictions and the case at bar were similar. The substances were marijuana 
n 
and methamphetamine. There were controlled buys made through a 
confidential informant. In both cases the Defendant denied that he had any 
ownership of the drugs. (R. 484/41-42). 
Defendant's attorney pointed out that only marijuana was involved in the 
prior incident, not methamphetamine and at the time of the prior incident 
Defendant was staying with a roommate. (R. 484/42-43). 
The trial court granted the State's motion in limine. The trial court 
stated that "the Ramirez and the Taylor case . . . seem to be fairly similar to 
what we're talking about here, evidence involving prior convictions for 
offenses that are similar to what he's on trial for. And in those cases, the court 
said that it was all right to admit the convictions." (R. 484/45). The trial judge 
also stated that "I think I'm inclined to grant the motion in limine at this point. 
I'm going to allow the state to introduce evidence to the prior convictions only 
as to drugs, okay?" (R. 484/47). The Court also acknowledged that those 
incidents took place in November and December of 2002. Id. 
The trial judge clarified his ruling by stating that: 
I just think based on the analysis in State versus Taylor and State 
versus Ramirez that were cited in the prosecutor's brief, it's just 
the similarities between what he's on trial for and the other prior 
convictions are close enough here to - obviously what a jury's 
trying to decide here is whether or not the defendant's involved in 
the sale or distribution of drugs. And I would think that 
somebody's who's claiming that they just happened to be in the 
wrong place at the wrong time, that's a little different situation 
1A 
than somebody who has been involved in selling drugs or 
distributing drugs in the past and now is on trial for the same 
thing. So I do think it's relevant in this case because it goes to the 
question of state of mind and whether or not he knew about the 
drugs in this particular case. "I'll grant the motion under 404(b) 
and to allow the state to introduce the prior convictions.(R. 
484/48). 
The trial judge did not engage in an analysis under rule 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. It does not appear from the record that he engaged in a 
"scrupulous examination" of the prior bad act evidence. As will be shown 
below, the trial court's reliance on State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), and State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) is misplaced. 
This prior conviction evidence was highly prejudicial to the Defendant. 
It only served to inflame the jury and show that he has a bad character. In State 
v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
"this Court has repeatedly held that evidence of other crimes may not be 
admitted to prove that the defendant has a bad character or a disposition to 
commit the crime charged." Id. at 1075. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states, 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets 
the requirements of 402 and 403.U.R.E. 404(b)(2002). 
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In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that "[t]o give meaning to the policy 
embodied in Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes must be reasonably 
necessary and highly probative of a material issue." State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 
at 1075. 
The incidents that the Defendant was originally convicted of occurred in 
November and December of 1992. The offenses he was convicted of in the 
case at bar occurred in February and March of 2001. State argued that the 
conviction that was eight and half years old somehow showed the Defendant's 
intent. The trial judge didn't articulate what purpose under Rule 404(b) the 
prior convictions were admitted under. He only found that they were 
admissible. 
In its efforts to justify admission, "the State has fallen into the common 
error of equating acts and circumstances where are merely similar in nature 
with the more narrow common scheme or plan." Id. at 429. The Defendant's 
prior convictions did not show knowledge or intent in the case at bar. The 
State simply said he did it before so he did it this time. During the prosecutor's 
closing argument he argued "[h]e [Agent Machielson] checks out his prior 
criminal history and finds out that the Defendant does have a history. He's 
been convicted before of distributing a controlled substance. Also, possession 
with intent and was convicted by a jury back in 1993." (R. 496/49). 
This is not the type of scenario that rule 404(b) envisions. In State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held that for 
prior bad acts to be admissible at trial, there had to be "a special relevance to a 
controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose other than to show the 
defendant's predisposition to criminality." Id. at 426. 
In State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the defendant was 
charged with rape from an incident that occurred in 1987. After the defendant 
was charged for the 1987 offense, two women came forward and accused the 
Defendant of raping them in 1985. The trial court allowed both women to 
testify at the defendant's trial for the 1987 incident. 
This Court found reversible error in allowing the two women to testify. 
"We cannot conclude that the actions of defendant constitute a common design 
or modus operandi. The similarities are common to many assault or rape cases 
and are not peculiarly distinctive of defendant's conduct. Defendant's acts 
were not so unique as to constitute a signature." Id. at 6. This Court also 
found that the prior bad acts were too remote in time. "The two prior acts 
occurred nearly two years before defendant was charged with a third, unrelated 
sexual assault. There s no apparent connection between defendant's earlier 
conduct and his intent in relation to the 1987 rape charge." Id. 
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There is absolutely no connection between the Defendant's convictions 
for the offenses that occurred in 1992 and the ones that occurred in 2001. 
Furthermore, there is nothing that is "signature-like" between the offenses. 
The similarities are common to almost every case that involves a confidential 
informant. In State v. Webster, 32 P.3d 976 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), this court 
reversed the trial court when it allowed prior bad act evidence at the trial. The 
defendant had been charged with stealing a car from a dealership lot. The trial 
court allowed evidence that the defendant did the same thing in Virginia. 
This Court relied on State v. DeCorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999) in its 
analysis. In DeCorso, there were "numerous" and "signature-like" similarities 
between the two offenses. In Webster, this Court held that "evidence of a prior 
bad act should be admitted only when it is shown 'that the other act and the 
charged offense are sufficiently idiosyncratic that a reasonable jury could find 
it more likely than not that the same person performed them both.'" State v. 
Webster, 32 P.3d at 987 (quoting United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 53 (1st 
Cir. 1995)). 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Defendant's 
convictions for acts that occurred in 1992 was probative of the fact that he had 
the intent to distribute controlled substances in 2001. The trial court exceed its 
discretion by allowing evidence of the prior convictions. 
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The trial court's reliance on State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), and State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) is misplaced. 
In Taylor, the facts are entirely different from the facts in this case. In Taylor, 
the prior bad act was twelve days earlier. The marijuana was identically 
packaged. It was divided into one pound amounts and packaged in identical 
two-gallon sized Ziploc bags. There were also accounting materials in the 
defendant's truck that indicated he had sold one pound to "Gil" who was the 
owner of the cabin where the marijuana was found. Id. at 570. 
The amount of time in Taylor is different. In Taylor, it was twelve days 
versus almost nine years. Also, there were "signature-like" qualities in how the 
marijuana was packaged and there was a record found in the defendant's truck 
that established a connection to the cabin that the marijuana was found. 
In Ramirez, a co-defendant was allowed to testify on rebuttal about other 
similar trips she had taken with the defendant to purchase drugs. State v. 
Ramirez, 924 P.2d at 368. This Court found that the defendant's prior drug-
buying trips to California with the witness were relevant to the issue of his 
knowledge and intent. Id. at 369. The facts in Ramirez, are factually different 
from those in the case at bar. The Defendant's convictions for acts that 
occurred in 1992 were to remote in time to have any bearing on his knowledge 
or intent in 2001. 
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A. ANY PROBATIVE VALUE WAS OUTWEIGHED BY ITS 
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT. 
Even if evidence of other crimes has relevance beyond proving mere 
criminal disposition, it is still subject to the protections of Rule 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. State v. Cox, 787 P.2d at 5. The factors a court should 
consider when weighing the probative value of prior conviction evidence 
against its prejudicial effect are "the similarities between the crimes, the 
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, 
the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably 
will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." Id. 
The trial Court did not do a Rule 403 analysis. It simply found that this 
case was similar to State v. Taylor, and State v. Ramirez. The Court failed to 
address the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time between the 
crimes, the need for the evidence and the effect the evidence would have on the 
jury. Since the trial court failed to engage in a Rule 403 analysis, this Court 
should reverse Defendant's conviction. 
B. THE PRIOR BAD ACTS WERE TOO REMOTE IN TIME. 
The Defendant's prior convictions were too remote in time to be 
admissible under Rule 404(b). Remoteness "refers to the time between the 
prior crime and the offense for which the accused is on trial." State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d at 430. The relevant inquiry is "whether the other acts 
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have clearly probative value with respect to the intent of the accused at the time 
of the offense charged." Id. In State v. Cox, this Court found that the prior bad 
acts were too remote in time when the prior acts "occurred nearly two years 
before . . ." State v. Cox, 787 P.2d at 6. This Court stated that "there was no 
apparent connection between defendant's earlier conduct and his intent in 
relation to the 1987 rape charge." Id. 
In State v. Feaiherson, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[t]he Tenth 
Circuit Court has developed a rigorous criteria for the admission of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to rule 404(b). The evidence, among other 
criteria, ' must be reasonably close in time to the crime charged.'" State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d at 430 (quoting United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 
1176 (10th Cir. 1988). See, also United States v. Mothershed, 859 F.2d 585, 
589-90 (8th Cir. 1988)(defendant's conviction about ten years previously of 
knowing possession of stolen bank funds was not relevant to show intent or 
motive in prosecution for aiding and abetting bank robbery and thus was 
inadmissible.) 
In the case at bar, there is absolutely no connection between the two 
offenses. There is over an eight year gap and they are not connected together 
in any way. For these reasons, the prior bad acts should not have been 
admitted at Defendant's trial. 
C. IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO ADMIT THE 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS. 
In order to constitute reversible error, the error complained must "be 
Sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant in its absence." State .v Bruce, 119 P.2d 646, 656 
(Utah 1989). In State v. Cox. This Court said that "[although the State 
presented evidence on which might be sufficient to sustain a rape conviction, 
we are nevertheless persuaded that the jury may have reached a different result 
in the absence of the highly prejudicial evidence of the prior sexual assaults." 
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d at 7. 
Informing the jury that the Defendant had previously been convicted of 
distributing drugs was highly prejudicial. If the "taint" caused by inadmissible 
evidence is sufficient, "it is irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence 
to support a verdict." State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989). 
Because the prior bad act evidence is so highly prejudicial, the Defendant's 
convictions should be reversed and the Defendant should receive a new trial. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT 
PROBALBE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE SEARCH 
WARRANT. 
Probable cause requires a "nexus between suspected criminal activity and 
the place to be searched. . . . In making a probable-cause determination, the 
issuing magistrate must examine the totality of the circumstances set forth in 
the affidavit, including an informant's veracity and basis of knowledge." 
United States v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1006 (10th Cir. 2000)(citations 
omitted). 
The ability of the government to search an individual's home should 
only be allowed after a neutral magistrate reviews an affidavit that convinces 
him that there is probable cause that there is a crime currently being committed 
by the person the warrant is addressing. See, United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 
51 (1951). 
The placement of the magistrate between the arresting officer and the 
defendant limits the government's arbitrariness which might otherwise occur if 
the determination of probable cause was left to the unbridled discretion of the 
police officer conducting the search. See, Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 
10,13-14(1948). 
In the case at bar, Agent Machielson used the term "Intelligence Report" 
to refer to what was in reality an undated, uncorroborated, anonymous report 
that was several months old. He used it as the first justification to obtain a 
search warrant for the Defendant's residence. (See copy of the "intelligence 
report" at R. 198, and the reference to it in the affidavit at R. 194). This 
"intelligence report" discussed an anonymous tip that the Defendant was 
involved with 154 pounds of marijuana that was found in a storage shed in 
Riverdale. 
Anonymous reports have a much lower degree of believability than does 
a report from a citizen who is named. In Kaysville v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 
(Ct. App. 1997), this Court listed three factors to take into account when 
analyzing the reliability of information to police. The first factor is the "type 
of tip or informant involved." Id. at 235. Not all informants or tips are equal. 
Anonymous informants are towards "the low-end of the reliability scale." Id. 
In contrast, a citizen who identifies himself is high on the reliability scale. Id. 
The second factor is whether the informant gave enough information to 
justify a stop or investigation. Id. at 236. The third factor is whether the 
officer corroborated the information. Id. These factors have been extended to 
review the evidence provided to a magistrate in an affidavit for a search 
warrant. See, State v. Valenzuela, 37 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
The "intelligence report," when viewed in its entirety has the lowest 
degree of reliability. The information comes from an anonymous source whose 
veracity and reasons for giving the information are unknown. Looking at the 
second factor, the tip does not list a date with the observations, it is made five 
months prior to the request for the search warrant, and would not, on its own 
support a search warrant. It was also uncorroborated by any kind of official 
observation. 
What's even more troubling is that the officer who signed the affidavit 
apparently knew that the Defendant was not a suspect in the case that involved 
the Riverdale storage shed. During the trial, Defendant's counsel questioned 
Agent Machielson about the Riverdale storage shed case. The following 
discussion took place. 
Q. In regard to the intelligence report that you were referring 
to-
A. Okay. 
Q. -See that? You read a portion that Andrew [Defendant] 
was telling the complainant he was somehow involved with 
the marijuana that was found in the Riverdale storage shed. 
You were familiar with that particular Riverdale storage 
shed that was referred to in that complaint? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. You were involved in the bust or the seizure of the 
marijuana found there is that -
A. 154 pounds, yes. 
Q. Mr. Lucero was never a suspect in that case; is that correct? 
A. No, he was not. 
Q. In fact, you prosecuted and convicted somebody who was a 
suspect in that case? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. It had nothing to do with Mr. Lucero? 
A. Nope. 
Q. And at the time that you received this report here, you 
understood that Mr. Lucero was not a suspect in that case? 
A. As far as I knew, yeah. I had no idea that he would be 
suspect in that. 
(R. 494/248-49). 
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Even though an arrest had been made and Agent Machielson knew that 
the Defendant wasn't a suspect in that case he included the information in the 
affidavit and called it an "intelligence report" instead of what it was which was 
an uncorroborated anonymous tip. The words "intelligence report" placed at 
the front of the affidavit requesting a search warrant could only be there to 
mislead the magistrate. 
There were other statements in the search warrant that are not supported 
by the record. The final paragraph of the affidavit states that the CI had 
worked for several different strike force agents for several years. (See, R. 196). 
When the CI was questioned by the prosecutor he was asked to describe how 
he got involved with the strike force. (R. 493/164). He answered, "I went - -
first I went to Kim Allen. I kind of just had enough of it. . . . He was agitating 
Ralph and I was just sick of it. . . . Pretty much just sick of it, you know, and so 
I went and spoke - -1 spoke with Kim Allen [AP&P] and then I - -1 get - - He 
called somebody on the strike force and then I was introduced to Jeff [Agent 
Machielson]." (R. 493/164-65). The prosecutor asked him "Who did you first 
meet with from the strike force?" He answered "I think it was Jeff [Agent 
Machielson]." (R. 493/165). 
The affidavit also failed to mention that the informant was being paid for 
his information. One "who gains information through criminal activity or who 
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is 'motivated . . . by pecuniary gain[,] . . . is lower on the reliability scale than a 
citizen-informant." State v. McArthur, 996, P.2d 555, 564 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000). 
The entire affidavit was tainted by the misleading and omitted 
information. The Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Nielsen, 727 p.2d 188 
(Utah 1986), that "the magistrate can only fulfill his constitutional function if 
the information give to him is true; the obvious assumption behind the warrant 
requirement is that the factual showing to support a finding of probable cause 
will be truthful." Id. at 190. 
In State v. Dable, 2003 UT 389 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), this Court recently 
reversed a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence on the grounds 
that the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause. The 
affidavit omitted the fact that the informant gave his information after he had 
been arrested for possessing controlled substances. This Court stated that "the 
information regarding Utah Informant's arrest, as well as the date when he 
gave them the information, was omitted from the affidavit, depriving the 
magistrate of important information which might have assisted him in making 
an independent evaluation of the informant's credibility in this matter." Id. 
Because of the omitted information this Court found that "when 
assessing the totality of the circumstances in this matter, we are unable to 
accord the Utah Deputies full credibility or the Utah Informant any degree of 
reliability." Id. 
A hearing was held on Defendant's motion to suppress on July 10, 2002. 
the trial judge denied the motion to suppress. He found that the affidavit was 
sufficient to establish probable cause. The most significant factor was that the 
police had a confidential make three separate purchases from the Defendant 
and that they monitored and listened in on the conversations. The court found 
that this alone established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. 
(R. 490/31-32). 
The misleading information that was contained in the affidavit calls the 
entire affidavit into question and taints the search warrant that was issued. For 
these reasons the trial court should have granted the Defendant's motion to 
suppress and his convictions for the offenses that resulted from the search 
warrant should be reversed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITED AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW 
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY TO CROSS EXAMINE THE 
STATE'S WITNESS CONCERNING A SPECIFIC INCIDENT 
OF UNTRUTHFULNESS. 
At the time of trial, Russ Hartley had entered into a plea in abeyance for a 
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theft charge. Defendant's attorney wanted to cross-examine him on 
matter, but the trial judge prohibited it. Defense counsel argued that it 
admissible under Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (R. 483/76). 
Rule 608(b) reads; 
Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the 
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting 
the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided 
in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, 
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness 
or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the 
witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness 
being cross-examined has testified. U.R.E. 608(b)(2002). 
The rule is clear that specific instances of conduct may be inquired 
into on cross-examination if they are probative or truthfulness or 
untruthfulness. The trial judge abused his discretion on this issue by not 
considering the circumstances surrounding Mr. Hartley's theft from his 
former employer. In his ruling the trial judge stated; 
I guess if you want to find a case for me that's right on point that 
says firing somebody for embezzlement constitutes 
untruthfulness, I'll certainly take a look at it and reconsider in the 
morning. But as it sits right now, I'm just not inclined to grant it. 
I mean, otherwise it makes such a mockery out of this system that 
says look, the only way you can attack is with convictions and 
they've either got to be felonies or they have to involve acts of 
dishonesty. I mean, I think it's fairly clear from the rules that we -
- we're very strict about attacking with specific instances. (R. 
493/282). 
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The trial judge also stated that "608 is really talking about opinion and 
reputation evidence. Does he have a reputation in the community for 
being dishonest or honest or truthful? I mean, you can parade all the 
witnesses you want for that question." (R. 493/283). 
The trial judge committed an abuse of discretion by applying the 
requirements of Rule 609 to Rule 608 not gaining a full understanding of what 
Rule 608 entails. He also committed an abuse of discretion when he didn't 
consider the facts concerning Mr. Hartley's theft and whether or not they 
constituted a specific instance of untruthfulness. The trial court also failed to 
do a Rule 403 analysis of this potential evidence. In State v. Gomez, 63 P.3d 
72 (Utah 2002), the Supreme Court stated that "[a] line of questioning on 
cross-examination regarding a witness's specific instances of past conduct that 
is probative of the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and 
therefore admissible under rule 608(b), may still be limited or prohibited by the 
trial court in its sound discretion under rule 403." Id. at 79. 
When a party attempts to introduce evidence under Rule 608 a court's 
job; 
is to balance the probative value of the specific-instances 
evidence against the potential dangers and costs of that evidence. 
The trial court must (1) evaluate and consider the probative value 
of the proffered testimony, that is, the extent to which the 
proposed testimony is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, 
(2) determine the degree to which the proffered testimony may 
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tend to inflame or prejudice the jury, and (3) balance the first two 
concerns to determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the testimony's probative value. 
Id.(citations and quotations omitted). 
Defense counsel proffered what the evidence would show. The 
Defendant worked at Wheelwright Lumber. He assisted people in getting 
lumber from the back of the lumber yard, loaded it into their vehicles, took it to 
their homes and did construction work on their homes. He did it without 
repaying Wheelwright Lumber for the things that were taken out of the back of 
their yard and without notifying them that he was doing the work for those 
people. When he was confronted with it he said that he had receipts, but that 
he couldn't find them. He denied any wrongdoing several times. When he was 
finally confronted with what the people had told Wheelwright lumber he 
confessed and asked for a chance to pay them back. (R. 493/281-82). 
The Court didn't do a Rule 403 analysis. He simply denied them the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness on that conduct. The trial judge at 
one point stated that "there is a case out there . . . where an individual had been 
convicted of theft, a misdemeanor theft. The court said just because you've 
been convicted of a theft doesn't equate with dishonesty." (R. 493/280) 
Defense counsel agreed and told the trial judge that you "need to take a look at 
the facts underlying it." (R. 493/280-81). 
The proffered facts clearly show a specific instance of conduct that is 
probative of the witness's truthfulness. He not only stole from his employer, 
but when he was confronted on it he repeatedly lied. For this reason, the 
Defendant should have been allowed to attack the witness's credibility by 
cross-examining him about that specific incident. 
Under Rule 609 the general rule is that theft ordinarily does not involve 
dishonesty. See, State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 655-56 (Utah 1989). The 
language in Rule 609 is different than the language in Rule 608. Rule 609 also 
addresses prior convictions, while 608 addresses the witness credibility 
concerning specific instances of untruthfulness. Nonetheless, under Rule 609 
"a prior conviction for theft may be admissible under the rule 'if in fact the 
crime was committed by fraudulent or deceitful means.'" Id. at 656 (citations 
omitted). 
Again, the Court failed to do an analysis of the proffered evidence under 
Rules 608 and 403. Instead, he tried to prohibit it under Rule 609 by finding 
that a plea in abeyance was not a conviction and that thefts are not crimes of 
dishonesty. Since the trial court failed to apply the appropriate analysis, this 
Court should find that there was an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the 
failure to attack Russ Hartley's credibility was extremely prejudicial to the 
Defendant. Mr. Hartley was the confidential informant who supplied most of 
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the information to the strike force. He was also the one who made three 
purchases and told the strike force officers that it was the Defendant who he 
bought the controlled substances from. When the officers couldn't find 
marijuana in Defendant's home they called Mr. Hartley for assistance. Mr. 
Hartley's credibility was crucial to the State's case. If his credibility would 
have been attacked to show that he has been untruthful in the past there is a 
reasonable likelihood that there would have been a different outcome at 
Defendant's trial. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a trial court to 
Grant a defendant a new trial "in the interest of justice if there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." 
U.R.Cr.P. 24 (2002). 
Defendant filed a motion in writing requesting a new trial. The motion 
outlined several errors that occurred during that trial that prejudiced the 
Defendant. 
A. THE STATE USED TESTIMONY THAT IT KNEW OR SHOULD 
HAVE KNOWN WAS FALSE. 
The State's main witness was the informant, Russ Hartley. During the 
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trial Mr. Hartley testified under oath the he only used marijuana and that he 
quit using it on November 11, 2001. (R. 493/168, 207-08, 211). 
After the trial, defense counsel learned that Russ Hartley had testified at 
the preliminary hearing in the case of State v. Kim Ray Teeter, Case No. 
011901690, before the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, held on August 29, 2001. 
(R. 409). Russ Hartley was the confidential informant, Agent Machielson was 
the investigating officer for the strike force, and Dean Saunders was the 
prosecutor. These were the same exact players in the Defendant's case. 
Mr. Hartley testified under oath at Kim Teeter's preliminary hearing that 
he was actively using cocaine until the first week of December 2000. (R. 409). 
This is in direct conflict with his testimony at Defendant's trial that he only 
used marijuana and that he quit using on November 11, 2000. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that in a case when a prosecutor uses 
testimony that he knows or should know is perjured, a conviction obtained by 
the use of such perjured testimony, "is fundamentally unfair and must be set 
aside, if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have 
affected the judgment of the jury." State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 
1980). Furthermore, the Court stated that good faith of the prosecution in such 
a situation is irrelevant. Id. at 224. 
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Mr. Hartley's testimony was key to the State's case. The prosecution of 
the three counts of distribution hinged almost solely on Mr. Hartley's 
testimony. There is a reasonable likelihood that if the jury knew that Mr. 
Hartley used hard drugs and testified falsely about his use, his credibility 
would have been affected. 
The trial court denied the Defendant's motion for a new trial. The trial 
Judge stated that "I'm just not sure that it makes any difference in this case as 
to how many different types of drugs he was using. He admitted on the stand 
that he'd used drugs in the past, he had a drug problem." R. 499/2-3. The trial 
judge also stated "I don't know that that really affects his credibility as to how 
many different types of drugs he was using, and I just don't remember anybody 
really pressing him hard as to the type of drug he was using." Id. 
The problem with this reasoning is that the issue goes beyond whether or 
not the witness used drugs, but to his credibility. The only ones in the 
courtroom who could have known that the Defendant testified falsely were the 
prosecutor and the officer. They were the only ones present at both hearings. 
If it would have come to the jury's attention that the witness had testified 
differently at another hearing about both the drugs he was using and when he 
quit using them his credibility for honesty would have been shot. It is very 
likely that they would not have believed the rest of his testimony. Especially if 
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they would have heard that he repeatedly lied when he was caught stealing 
from his employer. 
This Court should find that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
Defendant would have received a more favorable outcome had the error not 
occurred. The Defendant respectfully requests this Court to find the trial court 
abused its discretion by not granting him a new trial when it learned that the 
State's main witness had committed perjury. 
CONCLUSION 
The numerous errors that occurred prior to and during Defendant's trial, 
his right to a fair trial was denied. It is very likely that the Defendant would 
have received a more favorable result if the jury was unaware of his prior 
convictions and if they would have been aware of Russ Hartley's shady 
character. Based on these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse his conviction and grant him a newirial. 
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The Court, having received the briefs of counsel and heard the arguments of counsel as to 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial on January 29,2003, makes the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant received a fair trial. 
2. The Jury was well aware that the CI, Mr. Hartley was a drug user. How many different 
types of drugs he was using was not a central issue in this case and would not have affected his 
credibility with the Jury. 
3. Mr. Hartley's testimony was corroborated by the other evidence in this case. 
4. At the time that he testified, Mr. Hartley had not been convicted of the misdemeanor theft. 
The fact that Mr. Hartley was convicted of a misdemeanor theft after his testimony in this case does 
not provide a basis for a new trial. 
5. This Court had ruled that the allegation that Mr. Hartley had been fired from his 
employment for theft, was not admissible. Contrary to that ruling, defendant told the Jury at trial that 
Mr. Hartley had been fired for theft. The Jury was well aware of that fact, even though inadmissible, 
and any evidence concerning it would not have had, and did not have an effect on the Jury's verdict. 
6. Luis Ackerman was properly excluded from testifying at trial. He indicated that his 
information about Mr. Hartley's alleged dishonesty, was second hand information. Mr. Ackerman 
testified from what he knew he did not have an opinion about Mr. Hartley honesty or dishonesty. 
Based on those responses, the ruling that his testimony was inadmissible was proper. 
7. The State provided all of the discovery that was required in this case. The defense had all 
of the relevant information at the time of the trial and extensively used that to cross examine the 
State's witnesses. The defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice that he suffered because of 
the alleged discovery violations. 
8. Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, and the demeanor of the witnesses when 
they testified, there is no reasonable likelihood that jury verdict would have been any different. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant received a fair trial. 
2. The rulings of the Court, that the evidence of Mr. Hartley's alleged firing for theft, and that 
Mr. Ackerman's testimony was not admissible, were proper. Despite the Court's rulings to the 
2 
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contrary, defendant told the jury the information about Mr. Hartley anyway. All of that information 
about Mr. Hartley would not have had, and did not have an effect on the verdict of the Jury. 
3. The State provided proper discovery in this case. 
4. Based on how the CI's testimony was corroborated by the other evidence in this case, the 
totality of the evidence, and the demeanor of the witnesses when they testified, there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the outcome of the trial would not have been any different. 
Approved as to form: r\ 
VI^TOR/LAWRENCE 
torney for Defendant 
L/DEAN SAUNDERS 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
ORDER 
Wherefore, Defendant's Motion to for a new trial is Denied. 
DATED this / g ? day of Brassy , 2003. 
ERNIE W. JONES 
District Court Judge 
/ 
^X 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the proposed findings was hand delivered or 
mailed, postage pre-paid, to: 
Victor Lawrence 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 510290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
DATED this J _ day of February, 2003. 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANDREW LUCERO, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 011901619 FS 
Judge: ERNIE W. JONES 
Date: December 11, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: vennaw 
Reporter: COVINGTON, TRACY 
Prosecutor: SAUNDERS, L. DEAN 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LAWRENCE, VICTOR 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 25, 1960 
Video 
CHARGES 
DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE 
- Disposition: 08/20/2002 
DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE 
- Disposition: 08/20/2002 
DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE 
• Disposition: 08/20/2002 
DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE 
• Disposition: 08/20/2002 
DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE 
- Disposition: 08/20/2002 
TO DIST C/S 
Guilty 
TO DIST C/S 
Guilty 
TO DIST C/S 
Guilty 
TO DIST C/S 
Guilty 
TO DIST C/S 
Guilty 
2nd Degree Felony 
1st Degree Felony 
1st Degree Felony 
1st Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
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Case No: 011901619 
Date: Dec 11, 2002 
HEARING 
This is the time set for sentencing. Attorney Lawrence addresses 
the Court and requests the defendant be ordered to complete a 
diagnostic evaluation at the Utah State Prison. Attorney Saunders 
addresses the Court and argues that 
the defendant should be committed to the Utah State Prison, to 
commence forthwith. Mr. Saunders further argues that the defendant 
not receive credit for time served up until the conviction on this 
matter, as he was out on 
bail in this matter, and subsequently taken into custody on two 
separate witness tampering charges. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
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Date: Dec 11, 2002 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The sentence on each first degree felony shall run concurrently, 
but those sentences shall run consecutive with the second degree 
felony sentences. The second degree felonies shall also run 
concurrently, but consecutive to the first degree sentences. 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 205 day(s) previously served. 
Dated this / s day of /J^c^C^ 20^_^rr 
ERNIE W. JONES 
District Court Judde 4e 
T)-^^r^ -3 f 1 r*ci- \ ^Ql 
ADDENDUM B 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANDREW LUCERO, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
ORAL ARGUMENTS 
NOTICE 
Case No: 011901619 FS 
Judge: ERNIE W. JONES 
Date: April 22, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: vennaw 
Prosecutor: SAUNDERS, L. DEAN 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LAWRENCE, VICTOR 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 25, 1960 
Video 
Tape Number: J042202 Tape Count: 9:15 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S 
2. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S 
3. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S 
4. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S 
5. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S 
2nd Degree Felony 
1st Degree Felony 
1st Degree Felony 
1st Degree Felony 
1st Degree Felony 
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Case No: 011901619 
Date: Apr 22, 2002 
HEARING 
This is the time set for oral arguments on several motions filed 
by the defense. Agent Macheilson is also present for this hearing. 
Attorney Lawrence addresses the Court. Attorney Saunders responds. 
The Court denies defendant's motion to quash in 
relation to Agent Micheilson's testimony at preliminary hearing, 
the defense has argued that the official transcript does not reflet 
that Agent Micheilson was sworn prior to testifying. The Court 
will review the video tape made that date, to 
determine if he was in fact sworn. The Court takes this issue 
under advisement, but indicates that if the video tapes shows that 
he was sworn, the Court will deny this motion. Counsel stipulate 
that Agent Macheilson will have records searched 
and agrees to turn over to the State any further report(s) 
regarding information which may have been received about the 
defendant. The information may excluse names of persons providing 
the police tip. The State will then turn over any such 
applicable reports to the defense. The Court rules that prior bad 
acts convictions for like offenses are admissable at trial. The 
State has filed a motion in limine. Attorney Saunders addresses 
the Court. Attorney Lawrence responds. Russell Hartley 
is sworn and testifies. Further oral arguments is continued to 
May 1st at 4:00 p.m. The defendant is taken into custody at this 
time, no bail due to further allegations of witness tampering. 
This issue will be further addressed 
at the May 1st hearing. 
FURTHER ORAL ARGUMENTS is scheduled. 
Date: 05/01/2002 
Time: 04:01 p.m. 
Location: 4th Floor Southeast 
Second District Court 
252 5 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: ERNIE W. JONES 
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your Honor. The dates on these prior convictions as they 
relate to these offenses are about eight and a half years. 
Your Honor, there is other precedent in the code that 
talks about convictions being admitted less than 10 years old 
and the Rules of Evidence, convictions if they're less than 
10 years old and deal with a felony can come in. And also 
that rule, your Honor, talks about release from incarceration 
from the conviction of that offense. Mr. Lucero did go to 
prison on those prior offenses, he did go back once on a 
parole violations, so that lessens the time after he was 
released from those, your Honor, from when he committed these 
new offenses. 
I think the other things, the other elements are set out. 
Their main dispute was as to that. So if the Court has 
specific questions to that I'll respond to that. 
THE COURT: Let me just ask you: Are you asking to 
offer that as part of your case in chief or in rebuttal? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Yes, your Honor. No, under 404B 
that's part of your case in chief, your Honor, to show his 
intent. It also goes to establish the element of the prior 
conviction to enhance these. So that's what we're requesting 
under 404(b) that this be admitted as part of our case in 
chief. 
THE COURT: Well, normally on the enhancement when 
we do a jury trial, we don't mention the enhancement as part 
1 of the Case we just read the information. 
2 MR. SAUNDERS: Typically those are bifurcated and I 
3 would agree if that were the only reason, the state would be 
4 willing to do that. But your Honor, he's put his intent 
5 specifically at issue in this case by saying he wasn't 
6 involved in the possession of the drugs that were located in 
7 his home. The case law specifically talks about situations 
8 like that where you can use prior convictions to show 
9 somebody's intent, and we believe that we've established that 
10 clearly that he did have the prior convictions. It's 
11 appropriate to admit those under the circumstance under the 
12 case law, and we'd ask the Court to grant our motion in 
13 limine allowing that, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Do you want to just take a minute and 
15 tell me what the similarities are between the convictions 
16 and — 
17 MR. SAUNDERS: I will, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: -- and the case in chief? 
19 MR. SAUNDERS: Again, in those cases, it was a 
20 confidential informant that made the buys. The substances 
21 that we were again talking about were marijuana and 
22 methamphetamine. The buys were made from the defendant's 
23 home, they were controlled buys by a strike force agency at 
24 that point, and they're similar to that respect, your Honor. 
25 In that case he also denied the fact that he had any 
1 ownership of those drugs. They're similar to all those 
2 respects. I think that placed clearly at issue his intent in 
3 this case, his intent to possess that, his prior knowledge, 
4 plan, preparation. 
5 THE COURT: Let me ask you from your standpoint: 
6 Are you just intending to offer the certified convictions or 
7 were you going to offer testimony? 
8 MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, I believe that we would 
9 be limited to offering the certified convictions to show 
10 that. I don't believe we could bring in officers to 
11 specifically talk about those prior buys. Thatfs my 
12 recollection. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything else you 
14 wanted to mention then? 
15 MR. SAUNDERS: No, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lawrence, did you want 
17 to respond? 
18 MR. LAWRENCE: Yes, Judge. There is not the 
19 similarity that counsel would ask the Court to accept. The 
20 prior conviction involved buys regarding marijuana. No 
21 methamphetamines were relative to that conviction, those 
22 convictions. That's the first thing. 
23 The second thing, if the Court would allow counsel to use 
24 this for this purpose, any time any defendant enters a denial 
25 to the charges rather than an admission to the charges, all 
1 ~> 
of a sudden the issue of, well, now your intent comes into 
play. Wefve argued, in essence, that we're saying the best 
they have is a constructive possession. The difference is 
with that other charge was that that was a place where he 
clearly was staying with a roommate, this is not at his 
residence. So that coupled with the fact that this one 
includes meth as well is different, number one. 
Number two, they don't need to bring it into their case 
in chief. I think the Court is absolutely correct and I 
think the Jamison case that counsel provided in their 
response to my objection clearly articulates the procedure 
just as you stated, that it should be after a conviction, if 
and after a conviction, then it is presented at that stage. 
Procedurally that's how it should be handled, not in their 
case in chief. 
THE COURT: Okay. But let me ask you: If a 
defendant is saying, hey, this is a mistake, I didn't have 
anything to do with these drugs that are found in my home or 
where I'm residing, and a jury learns that he's been 
convicted before for 
directly to 
MR. 
this ques 
LAWRENCE 
his residence, Judge. 
THE 
we've got a 
! COURT: 
defendant 
the same thi 
tion of 
: They 
It is 
Well, ri 
saying, 
his 
have 
dras 
.ght. 
hey 
ng, doesn 
intent? 
to prove 
't that evidence 
first that 
tically different. 
I understand that. 
, gee, I didn't have 
it is 
But 
go 
if 
1 anything to do with the drugs, I don't know anything about 
2 them, I just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong 
3 time and then you have evidence showing that hefs made sales 
4 of drugs on other occasions, doesn't that evidence go 
5 directly to that issue? 
6 MR. LAWRENCE: I don't think it does, Judge. Again, 
7 I'm arguing on behalf of my client because what they are 
8 trying to do is quote, unquote, bootstrap this. It's 
9 clearly — it's different than the last case. We're holding 
10 the last conviction over his head like the sword of Damocles, 
11 and this case we're not entitled to do that. This doesn't 
12 show anything other than technically it gives them the 
13 opportunity to enhance the charges. This isn't used to show 
14 the intent because it's different, Judge. That was not his 
15 residence, the first time was his residence and that. The 
16 first time involved marijuana, this time involves marijuana 
17 and methamphetamines. It's clearly different. They can't 
18 use that conviction and bootstrap to show intent on this one. 
19 THE COURT: I agree. If the conviction had nothing 
20 to do with selling or distributing drugs, for example, let's 
21 say it was a theft conviction or a forgery, then it wouldn't 
22 have any relevance. But here they're trying to show a 
23 I similarity between what he was convicted of in 1992 and what 
24 | he's on trial for at this time in 2002, so isn't that a 
25 I little different? 
4 0 
MR. LAWRENCE: It is different, I'm not going to 
argue itfs not, Judge. But it's a quantum leap for them to 
be able to do that, to bootstrap this in. The fact that 
they're looking at it — they have this technical window of 
opportunity that says, hey, we get to bring it in because of 
this technicality. But the Court can look at it and see that 
you know what, we're clearly well beyond any notion of modus 
operandi or of a pattern of what had happened here. We're 
almost to the 10-year period here where even the Court 
wouldn't entertain this discussion. 
THE COURT: Well, did you take a look at the two 
cases, the Ramirez and the Taylor case that were cited by the 
prosecutor? I mean, they seem to be fairly similar to what 
we're talking about here, evidence involving prior 
convictions for offenses that are similar to what he's on 
trial for. And in those cases, the court said that it was 
all right to admit the convictions. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Yeah. But in both of those cases it 
was all right because I think the court was able to establish 
that there is a nexus here and the issue is directly at hand 
here. In this case I'm saying that it's not. They have a 
burden first. What they're trying to do is bootstrap 
everything else into it. The only thing that I can argue I 
think is, Judge, in relation to time and the dissimilarity in 
the two offenses, this one should not be bootstrapped into 
4 O 
Lhe present case, the prior convictions should not be 
bootstrapped into the present case prior case. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, let me clarify — I!m 
sorry. 
MR. LAWRENCE: That's all I have, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, let me clarify one thing. 
He was correct about the prior convictions. I thought that 
they involved methamphetamine as well but they involve 
marijuana. The similarity there, your Honor, there was a 
large quantity of marijuana that was found in that case. 
There was almost a pound of marijuana that was found in this 
case. All evidence is that this was Mr. Lucerofs residence. 
His girlfriend indicated that these drugs were his that he 
had sold from the house in the past. This isn't in a 
constructive possession case as far as that goes. Your 
Honor, these offenses are similar, and based on the case laws 
as the court cited, the admission is appropriate. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Judge, brief response to — 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. LAWRENCE: And that is and I!ll bring up again 
the lack of similarity. The prior case, the prior 
conviction, Mr. Lucero was arrested at his residence. In 
this case, there!s no question he was arrested at his 
1 I residence which is not the place where the drugs were found. 
2 He was transported to this place, Judge. And so therefs 
3 clearly a definite line of demarkation as far as any 
4 similarity with these. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Well, I think Ifm inclined 
6 to grant the motion in limine at this point. I'm going to 
7 allow the state to introduce evidence to the prior 
8 convictions only as to drugs, okay? So I assume we're just 
9 talking about distribution or possession of controlled 
10 substances. 
11 MR. SAUNDERS: That's correct. 
12 THE COURT: And those took place I believe in 
13 November and December of 1992? 
14 MR. SAUNDERS: That's correct. 
15 THE COURT: All right. And the only thing you 
16 intend to offer is just certified copies of the conviction? 
17 MR. SAUNDERS: Yes. 
18 THE COURT: Now, do you have the convictions? 
19 MR. SAUNDERS: We do, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Have you given copies of those to 
21 Mr. Lawrence so he can take a look at those? 
22 MR. SAUNDERS: We'll be happy to do that, your 
23 I Honor, certified copies of those. I think he's aware of 
24 I those but we'll be happy to provide certified copies. They 
25 I do show on his rap sheet I think that we gave you a copy of. 
1 O 
THE COURT: I just think based on the analysis in 
State versus Taylor and State versus Ramirez that were cited 
in the prosecutor's brief, it's just the similarities between 
what he's on trial for and the prior convictions are close 
enough here to — obviously what a jury's trying to decide 
here is whether or not the defendant's involved in the sale 
or distribution of drugs. And I would think that somebody's 
who's claiming that they just happened to be in the wrong 
place at the wrong time, that's a little different situation 
than somebody who has been involved in selling drugs or 
distributing drugs in the past and now is on trial for the 
same thing. So I do think it's relevant in this case because 
it goes to the question of state of mind and whether or not 
he knew about the drugs in this particular case. I'll grant 
the motion under 404 (b) and to allow the state to introduce 
the prior convictions. 
All right. Anything that we need to clarify about the 
order as far as the prior convictions? 
MR. SAUNDERS: I don't believe so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lawrence anything else? 
MR. LAWRENCE: No. I think you've covered 
everything, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. Any other motions that we 
need to take up at this time or — 
MR. SAUNDERS: No motions, your Honor. We'll 
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FOUNDATION ABOUT WHEN IT WAS RECEIVED. I THINK THAT WOULD BE 
AN IMPORTANT QUESTION. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
Q. (BY MR. LAWRENCE) I'VE HEARD YOU TALK IN THE A 
VERNACULAR, NOW I HEARD WHAT MR. HARTLEY TALKS (SIC) IS THAT 
THE WAY YOU GUYS USUALLY TALK? 
A. RIGHT. 
MR. LAWRENCE: YOUR HONOR, I HAVE NO FURTHER 
QUESTIONS FOR MR. LUCERO. 
THE COURT: CROSS. 
MR. SAUNDERS: WOULD YOU LIKE TO START THAT NOW, 
YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: YES. LET'S GO AHEAD IF WE COULD. 
MR. SAUNDERS: OKAY, 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SAUNDERS: 
Q. MR. LUCERO, BACK IN 1993 YOU WERE CONVICTED OF THREE 
COUNTS OF DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND ALSO ONE COUNT WITH A POSSESSION OF CONTROL SUBSTANCE 
WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, CORRECT? 
A. RIGHT. 
Q. FOUR COUNTS ALTOGETHER. 
MR. SAUNDERS: MAY I APPROACH THE WITNESS, YOUR 
HONOR? 
168 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
Q. (BY MR. SAUNDERS) SHOWING YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS 
STATE'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT NUMBER 17, IS THAT A TRUE AND 
CORRECT COPY OF A JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION OF THOSE COUNTS? 
A. WELL, IT SAYS IT IS BUT I'VE NEVER SAW THIS EITHER, BUT 
YEAH. 
Q. BUT THAT IS WHAT HAPPENED, YOU WERE CONVICTED OF THOSE 
FOUR COUNTS? 
A. RIGHT. 
Q. OKAY. AND I THINK YOU INDICATED TO THE JURY THAT YOU 
ENDED UP GOING TO PRISON FOR THAT, CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
MR. SAUNDERS: I'D MOVE INTO EVIDENCE STATE'S 
EXHIBIT 17, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION? 
MR. LAWRENCE: I THINK WE HAD --IF THE COURT WANTS 
TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE, HE'S CLEARLY IDENTIFIED HE CAN'T 
IDENTIFY THE DOCUMENT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. SAUNDERS: WE ALSO HAVE THE CRIMINAL FILE HERE, 
YOUR HONOR, IF THE COURT WILL TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THAT AS 
WELL. 
THE COURT: IS THAT A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE 
CONVICTION? 
MR. SAUNDERS: WE DO. 
ADDENDUM C 
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MR. LAWRENCE: No, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Based on the briefs that 
I've taken a look at and also the arguments of counsel, I'm 
going to deny the motion to quash the search warrant. As you 
recall, a search warrant which has been signed by a judge is 
presumed to be valid. In this case it was signed by Judge 
Taylor — or at least starts off with the presumption the 
search warrant is valid. 
Second, the Court will find that the affidavit in this 
case is sufficient to establish probable cause for the 
issuance of a search warrant. The affidavit I thought was 
fairly well written. It starts off indicating that police 
had received -- they called it an intelligence report. What 
it is essentially is somebody has given them information 
about people who are dealing drugs. 
And the two areas that I thought were significant was 
that they indicated Mr. Lucero hides drugs at the Tile Man, 
which was his business at 1400 Washington Boulevard; and, 
also, at his home located on Canyon Road, apartment number 2. 
Then they indicated that they did some checking and found he 
did have a criminal history, had several arrests for 
possession of controlled substances, at least one in 1986. 
And then third, and probably most significant, is the 
fact that the police are able to have a confidential 
informant go in, make three different purchases from the 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
(801) 395-1055 
2ND DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT IORSEAKJ i l WAHK VINT 
The undersigned being first d\ il) sworn, deposes and says: 
That the Affiant has reason to believe that; 
That on the prcmisc(s) known as; 
1120 CANYON RD., #2, OGDEN , UTAH: A two story single condominium that is brown in color, The 
condominium has a garage that sits to the North . The front door faces North-East and is brown in color. 
The condominium is designated number 2 and has the number in gold over the front door. 
Ot t! t :: ] c, x ; n i i ; t": ' i: •  ::!i • 1 nt1 : • i a ! lis] >anic i i mlc, 5f6 175 lbs,, with b lack hair and brown eyes. (D.O.B. 9-25-
60) 
In the City of OGDEN, County of WEBER, State of UTAH, there is now certain property or evidence described 
as: 
MARIJUANA, i) green leafy subsUncc in dried foi ITL 
• Materials used to package marijuana, specifically, plastic sandwich bags. 
Materials for using marijuana: 
1. Cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with adhesive on one side, 
2 Pipes, used to smoke marijuana, 
3. Roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being smoked. 
• Personal notes, records or narcotic transactions, listing names, dates, amenints sold. 
in 1 fllXI[AMHili 1 AMINE, a yellowish white powdery substance. 
Materials for packaging mcthamphctaminc, specifically small plastic baggier. 
Materials for using methamphetamine, including hollow tubes for snorting mcthamphcbiminc, 
small spoons for snorting methamphetamine, minors for holding methamphetamine while 
being snorted, razor blades for cutting methamphetamine into lines, 
• Scales for weighing methamphetamine. 
Cut, substance used to dilute the methamphetamine. 
That said property or evidence: 
• Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
• Has been used to commit or conceal a public offense. 
• Will be used to commit or conceal a public offense. 
• Is evidence of i I legal conduct, 
The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant arc: 
Search Warrant affidavit • PaR* 1 
1 O 0 
PROn : l^ EBERriORGON hHX NU. ibdVtildti Id dk)k3d kM.Diri ' l r o 
Your affiant, Jeff Machiclson is a ;•< !icc officer with the Ogdcn Oil) P< ?!iee Department and hits been 
employed as a police officer since March, 1998. Affiant is currently assigned as an Agent for the 
Wcbcr/Morgan Narcotics Strike Force. Your affiant graduated from Crown point High School in 
Crown Point Indiana in March, 1991.Your affiant graduated from Utah Police Officer Standards and 
Training Academy in February of 1997, Your Affiant has received numerous hours in narcotics training 
including training in search warrant preparation and execution. Your affiant has successfully completed 
the Utah Drug academy and the Regional Counter Drug Training Academy in Meridian, Mississippi. 
Your affiant also has experience in instructing new police hires in narcotics identification, Your affiant 
has received training and ! ins personal knowledge through his experience of the use, sales and 
manufacturing of cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphctamincs, marijuana, heroin and other designer 
drugs. Your affiant knows what items would most be found at a premise where there are suspects using, 
selling or manufacturing any of these drugs and these items arc those that are to be searched for. 
On (0-11-00 Your Affiant received an intelligence report that stated thai Andrew Ltiecro was dealing large 
amounts of marijuana and methamphetamine. The report also said that Andrew was involved m a case where 
Agent Bills, along with your Affiant, seized 154 pounds of marijuana from a Riverdalc storage shed. The report 
also stated thai Andrew runs the "Tile Man" store located in the 1400 block of Washington Blv. The report Raid 
fhui Andrew hides his narcotics a his home located at 1120 Canyon Rd. tfl and at the "Tile Man" store. 
On 2-214) I V ( Rtr Affiant i cceived information from Officer V crkler that he had responded to the 
"Tile Man" .More located at 1468 Washington Blv. Officer Verklcr made contact with Andrew Lucero who runs 
the store, The call for sei vice was a suspcious cicurnstancc and no action WAS taken 
Your A ffiant cheeked Andrew Lucero's criminal history and 1: < n n i i il .1 h li n s :iy : • TTTII ai t • :si s for distribution 
wd possession of a control led substance dat ing back to 1986, 
Further grounds for issuance of a search war rant are a t tached hereto and n icorpui ated herein. 
In February of 2001 your Affiant was contacted by a confident ial i n fo rman t (hereaf ter referred to as CI) 
that mari juana could be purchased from A n d r e w Lucero at 1120 C a n y o n Rd 112. Y o u r Affiant met with the 
CI at a pre-ar ranged mee t ing spot atid the CI was searched wi th no con t r aband be ing found. Your Affiant 
fitted the CI with an electronic monitoring device and given an amount of recorded Str ike Force money. Your 
Affiant followed the CI to 1120 Canyon Rd #2 never losing si te of the CI . T h e CI en te red the condomin ium 
and Your Affiant hcsinl, via the electronic monitor ing device, a d iscuss ion of price and quant i ty between the 
CI and a male. The CI left the condomin ium and w a s followed by your Affiant to w mee t ing spot. Your 
Affiant i\cvcv lost s ight of the CI. At the mee t ing spot the CI turned over a plas t ic b a g g y that contained n 
green leafy substance that Your Affiant recognized as mari juana. T h e Of s tated that the m a l e voice thai your 
Affiant heard was A n d r e w I .uccro. The CI iilso said that Andrew Luce ro sold the m a n juana to the CI. 
In February of 2001 Your Affiant was contacted by the CI w h o said that m c i h u m p h e t a m i n c could be 
purchased from A n d r e w Lucero at 1120 Canyon Rd. #2. Y o u r Affiant me t with the CI at a pre-arranged 
meet ing spol and the CI was searched. No contraband was; found. The CI \\ w. ; fitted with ar \ electronic 
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monitoring device and #ivcn an a$£unt of recorded Strike Force money. Your Affiant followed the CI. to 
1120 Canyon Rd. # 2 . Your Affiant never lost sight of the CI. The CI entered the condominium and your 
Affiant heard the CI discuss price and quantity with a male voice identified as Andrew Lucero by the CI. The 
CI left the condominium and your Affiant followed the CI to a meeting spot. Your Affiant never lost sight 
of the CI. At the meeting spot the CI turned over a plastic baggy that contained an amount of an off-white 
substance that your Affiant recognized as methamphetaminc. Your Affiant tested this substance in the type 
A NIK field test an if showed a positive reaction for amphetamines. The CI told your Affiant that the sale was 
conducted by Andrew Lucero, The CI also said that there is always a large amount of narcotics in the 
condominium.. 
"Within the last 24 hours your Affiant COT jductcd a third controlled purchase of methamphetaminc from 
Andrew Lucero at 1120 Canyon Rd, #2, Your Affiant was contacted by the CI and we met at a pre-arranged 
meeting spot. The CI was searched with no contraband being found. The CI was fitted with an electronic 
monitoring device. The CI was also given an amount of recorded Strike Force money. Your Affiant followed 
the CI to 1120 Canyon Rd. 112 never losing sight of the CI. The CI went into the condominium u left a short 
time later. Your Affiant followed the CI to the meeting spot ,nevqr losing sight of the CI, where the CI turned 
over an amount of a off white substance that your AffianL recognized as methamphetaminc. The substance 
showed a positive reaction for amphetamines in the type A NIK field test kit. The CI said that the sale was 
conducted by Andrew Lucero. The C! also stated that Andrew took the money from the sale and put it in his 
pocket. 
Your Affiant knows that distributers of i larcotics often coi iceal money and evidence on there persons. 
Your Affiant also knows that Andrew Lucero is a heavy user of methamphetaminc. Your Affiant has been 
told by the CT that Andrew appeared to be under the influence of narcotics on all three purchases, Your 
Affiant knows, from training and experience, that narcotics users often conceal there personal use narcotics 
and the paraphernalia to ingest them on their persons, 
WHBllFTORn, the Affiant prays that the search warrant be issued 
or night due to the following reasons: 
During the controlled purchases your Affiant saw vehicles coming to 1120 Canyon Rd. itl. Your Affiant also 
heard, via the electronic mentioning device, phone conversations from the suspect telling people to stop by the 
house to purchase narcotics, Your Affiant knows, from training and experience, that if Police arc spotted 
approaching the residence that the suspect may have time to flee or destroy evidence concealed in the 
condominium, Your Affiant Believes that these individuals frequenting the hou.se would inform the suspect of 
a police presence. Due to The location of the residence it will difficult for officers to approach. The residence 
sit* very near to the main entrance of the complex and your Affiant knows that the suspect may sec Officers 
approaching in the daylight hours and have time to destroy evidence, 
It is further requested that the officer caccuiwv, tht -• aiu«irp ' '^ i , «h * f" v ^<" .-This authority on 
purpose because of the following reasons: 
Your Affiant has evidence of past violent erirninal history on the suspect at this premise and a no noliee 
entry is needed for the safety of the officers. Your Affiant cheeked the criminal history of Andrew Lucero and 
found several arrests for assault, assault with injury and interfering with arrest. Your Affiant also found that 
..•A T u. * s \i s.j^'ce' -•--*"-» recent assaults that did not result in arrest. 
v>v * - , . r, ? l U r -u,;on from a confidential informant that the suspect at this location have 
• a*:e th'-ea^ : ** i. f * ^ < " <' f police are to attempt to enter the premises, Your Affiant has received 
• ,
 : r - : (r 'spect does not like Police The suspect also has u past history of resisting 
$C.ftrt:h Warrant Affidavit - t'n\*t>.? 
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arrest Your Affiant also beard, via tl^ejeclronic monitoring device, the suspect talking about previous assaults 
and how he would conduct them, 
Your Affiant believes that if given the opportunity the suspect may pose a threat to Officers attempting 
to execute the search warrant, Your Affiant also knows, from training and experience, that the suspect could 
barricade himself inside the condominium if given the opporiimiiy and therefore causing safety concerns for the 
Officers. 
Your Affiant believes that Andi ew Lucero 'is running an ongoing narcotics distribution operation from 
1120 Canyon Rd. #2 . Your Affiant believes that this criminal activity will continue to be a threat to the 
surrounding community if it is not stopped. 
The CI has worked for several different Agents of the Strike Force for several years. The CI has 
provided information that has led to several arrests and convictions for narcotics violations and seizures of 
large quantities of narcotics. The CI has provided your Affiant with their full and correct information and 
has made all appointments on time. The CI is a former drug user and is knowledgeable is the appearance,usc 
and distribution of narcotics. The CI has maintained daily contact with your Affiant. The CI is not suspect in 
this or any pending eases, 
>» 11R S( Tv 11 \ 111 , \ Nl) SWORN TO BEFORE ME thk ,?n<?/ 
INTHE2NT)DISTRIC 
IN AND FOR WEBKR COUNTY 
STMT? OF UTAH 
Search Warrant AJJithvit - Par.c 4 
EXHIBIT B 
NARRATIVI'l FMR . CR- 00-0000021010 
T-Case 
Complainanti Refused 
Suspect: Andrew Lucero 
Lori Lucero 
Address; 3 3 20 Canyon, Rrad tl •' 
10/11/00; The comp reported the suspect/ Andrew Lucero, is dealing large 
amounts of meth and marijuana. Andrew was telling the comp that he is some IIOW 
involved with the marijauan that was found in the Riverdale storage shed* 
Andrew runs The Tile Man on 13th and Washington. He drives a big blue Blazer 
and hides his drugs under his ashtray and in his shock covers. Andrew keeps 
hiH drugs at 112 0 Canyon Road #2 or at The Tile Man. 
10/24/00 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANDREW LUCERO, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
ORAL ARGUMENTS 
NOTICE 
Case No: 011901619 FS 
Judge: ERNIE W. JONES 
Date: July 10, 2002 
PRESENT 
Clerk: vennaw 
Reporter: SHINGLE, LAURIE 
Prosecutor: SAUNDERS, L. DEAN 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LAWRENCE, VICTOR 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 25, 1960 
Video 
Tape Number: J071002 Tape Count: 5:35 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S 
2. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S 
3. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S 
4. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S 
5. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S 
2nd Degree Felony 
1st Degree Felony 
1st Degree Felony 
1st Degree Felony 
1st Degree Felony 
Paae 1 0\ q 
Case No: 011901619 
Date: Jul 10, 2002 
HEARING 
This is the time set for pre-trial conference and oral arguments 
on defendants motion to suppress. The exclusionary rule is 
invoked. Agent Machielson is sworn and testifies. Mr. Lawrence 
makes closing arguments. Attorney Saunders makes 
closing arguments. The Court denies the motion to suppress. The 
court finds the search warrant was valid and the affidavit was 
sufficient to establish probable cause for the search warrant. 
Jury trial is confirmed to go forward as scheduled. 
This matter is continued one week for further hearing. 
FURTHER PRE-TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 07/17/2002 
Time: 02:06 p.m. 
Location: 4th Floor Southeast 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: ERNIE W. JONES 
Pacre 2 (last) 
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WAS, IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN A CUTTER. 
Q. OKAY. WHO DIRECTED YOU TO THE METHAMPHETAMINE THAT YOU 
FOUND IN THE SEARCH WARRANT? 
A. LORI LUCERO. 
Q. OKAY. 
MR. SAUNDERS: I DON'T HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS, 
YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE? 
MR. LAWRENCE: JUST BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR. 
RECROSS-EXftMINZ\TICN 
BY MR. LAWRENCE: 
Q. IN REGARD TO THE INTELLIGENCE REPORT THAT YOU WERE 
REFERRING TO --
A. OKAY. 
Q. -- SEE THAT? YOU READ A PORTION THAT ANDREW WAS TELLING 
THE COMPLAINANT HE WAS SOMEHOW INVOLVED WITH THE MARIJUANA 
THAT WAS FOUND IN THE RIVERDALE STORAGE SHED. 
YOU WERE FAMILIAR WITH THAT PARTICULAR RIVERDALE STORAGE 
SHED THAT WAS REFERRED TO IN THAT COMPLAINT? 
A. ABSOLUTELY. 
Q. YOU WERE INVOLVED IN THE BUST OR THE SEIZURE OF THE 
MARIJUANA FOUND THERE IS THAT --
A. 154 POUNDS, YES. 
Q. MR. LUCERO WAS NEVER A SUSPECT IN THAT CASE; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
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A. NO, HE WAS NOT. 
Q. IN FACT, YOU PROSECUTED AND CONVICTED SOMEBODY WHO WAS A 
SUSPECT IN THAT CASE? 
A. ABSOLUTELY. 
Q. IT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH MR. LUCERO? 
A. NOPE. 
Q. AND AT THE TIME THAT YOU RECEIVED THIS REPORT HERE, YOU 
UNDERSTOOD THAT MR. LUCERO WAS NOT A SUSPECT IN THAT CASE? 
A. AS FAR AS I KNEW, YEAH. I HAD NO IDEA THAT HE WOULD BE 
SUSPECT IN THAT. 
Q. THANK YOU. 
A. OTHER THAN WHAT THIS SAYS. 
Q. AND ON THE — ACTUALLY, THE SECOND PAGE, THE FOLLOWING 
INTELLIGENT REPORT WAS LOCATED ON 4/22/01. YOUR TESTIMONY 
TODAY WAS THAT YOU JUST LOCATED THAT THIS YEAR, IT WAS ON 
4/22/02? 
A. OKAY. I'M SORRY, MR. LAWRENCE, I'M ABOUT DATED OUT SO 
YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE TO SLOW DOWN FOR ME. 
Q. I'M JUST SAYING IF YOU LOOK — WHAT DATE DID YOU STATE 
THAT YOU LOCATED THE INTELLIGENCE REPORT? 
A. I STATED THAT I FOUND IT FOR — AND I STATED I FOUND IT 
FOR YOU ON 4/22/01. IT SHOULD BE 4/22/02. 
Q. OKAY. THAT'S JUST -- IT'S JUST NOT ACCURATE? 
A. IT'S A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR. 
Q. REGARDING THE BLIND SPOT FROM WHERE YOU SAW HIM GET TO 
ADDENDUM D 
276 
I'LL DENY THE MOTION AT THIS POINT. 
MR. BLAKELY: OKAY. NEXT, YOUR HONOR — 
THE COURT: OKAY. GO AHEAD. 
MR. BLAKELY: NEXT, YOUR HONOR, WAS THE — THE 
QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT WE COULD ASK ON 
CROSS-EXAMINATION MR. HARTLEY REGARDING SPECIFIC ACTS OF 
DISHONESTY. AND FOR THIS, YOUR HONOR, THERE NEEDS TO BE A 
SEPARATION BETWEEN A CONVICTION AND THE ACT THAT UNDERLIES A 
CONVICTION. 
RULE 609 OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE STATE THAT A 
CONVICTION IS NOT GOING TO BE PROPER UNLESS IT INVOLVES AN 
ACT OF DISHONESTY, OR IS A FELONY. 
RULE 608 THOUGH — AND I'M READING FROM 608(B) ON 
SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT — SAYS: SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF 
THE CONDUCT OF A WITNESS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTACKING OR 
SUPPORTING THE WITNESS' CREDIBILITY, OTHER THAN CONVICTION OF 
A CRIME AS PROVIDED IN RULE 609, MAY NOT BE PROVED BY 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. THEY MAY, HOWEVER, IN THE DISCRETION OF 
THE COURT, IF PROBATIVE OF TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS BE 
INQUIRED INTO ON CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS, ONE, 
CONCERNING THE WITNESS' CHARACTER FOR TRUTHFULNESS OR 
UNTRUTHFULNESS; OR TWO, CONCERNING THE CHARACTER FOR 
TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS OF ANOTHER WITNESS — THAT 
PART DOESN'T APPLY. 
IN GIVING THE TESTIMONY, WHETHER BY AN ACCUSED OR BY ANY 
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OTHER WITNESS, DOES NOT OPERATE AS A WAIVER OF THE ACCUSED'S 
OR THE WITNESS' PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WHEN 
EXAMINED -- OKAY. 
I REALLY THINK, YOUR HONOR, THAT ACTS THAT UNDERLIE A 
CONVICTION OR UNDERLIE A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, AS LONG AS 
THE COURT ACTION, BEING CHARGED WITH A CRIME, BEING CONVICTED 
OF A CRIME, OR THAT A CRIMINAL CASE IS PENDING, CAN STILL BE 
GOTTEN INTO UNDER RULE 608(B). 
THE COURT: BUT HE — HE HASN'T BEEN CHARGED. IT 
WASN'T EVEN REPORTED TO THE POLICE, AT LEAST — 
MR. BLAKELY: ACTUALLY, IT WAS REPORTED TO THE 
POLICE. HE WAS CHARGED WITH THE THEFT AND THERE'S A PLEA IN 
ABEYANCE IN EFFECT. SO THE STATUS OF THE CASE IS STILL 
PENDING. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WE ALL KNOW HOW A PLEA IN 
ABEYANCE WORKS, RIGHT? 
MR. BLAKELY: WELL, YOUR HONOR --
THE COURT: YOU ENTER A PLEA, AS LONG AS HE MEETS 
THE CONDITIONS THEN IT'S DISMISSED. THERE IS NO CONVICTION. 
MR. BLAKELY: AND IT HAS NOT BEEN DISMISSED YET. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. BLAKELY: BUT EVEN IF — LET'S SAY FOR INSTANCE 
HE WAS WORKING FOR AN EMPLOYER. THEY FOUND THAT HE WAS 
TAKING MONEY OUT OF THE TILL AND THEY FIRED HIM WITHOUT 
CALLING THE POLICE. IT'S GOING TO BE EXACTLY THE SAME TYPE 
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OF INSTANCE AS WE HAVE HERE WHERE HE WAS FOUND STEALING ITEMS 
FROM THE -- FROM THE STORE. THEY CALLED THE POLICE, HE 
CONFESSED THAT HE DID IT, AND THEY FIRED HIM AND ALSO FILED 
CRIMINAL CHARGES. 
THE COURT: BUT THEN WHAT DID THIS PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
DO? 
MR. BLAKELY: THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE --
THE COURT: IF WE TELL A DEFENDANT THAT HE CAN ENTER 
A PLEA AND THAT IF HE MEETS ALL THE CONDITIONS, AT THE END 
THEN WE'RE GOING TO DISMISS THE CASE, THEN THIS ALL MEANS 
NOTHING, RIGHT? 
MR. BLAKELY: THEN THERE'S NO — WELL, THEN THERE'S 
NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. BLAKELY: THE — THE EQUATION THAT I'D LIKE TO 
MAKE IS IF A PERSON IS CHARGED WITH D.U.I., WITHIN 10 DAYS OF 
RECEIVING THE D.U.I. HE CAN MAKE A WRITTEN REQUEST TO THE 
DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES TO HAVE A HEARING ON WHETHER OR 
NOT HIS LICENSE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED. NOW, THAT D.U.I. CHARGE 
COULD BE DISMISSED. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. BLAKELY: SAY THE OFFICER IS — CAN'T BE LOCATED 
OR FOR ANY OTHER REASON, THAT CONVIC — THAT — THAT CASE CAN 
BE DISMISSED; HOWEVER, THE DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES CAN 
STILL GO AHEAD AND SUSPEND HIS LICENSE FOR 90 DAYS. THE TWO 
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ARE COMPLETELY SEPARATE. 
IN MUCH THE SAME WAY, THE ACTS UNDERLYING A CRIMINAL 
CASE, IN MY MIND, YOUR HONOR, IS — IS THE TYPE OF THING 
THAT'S LOOKED AT UNDER RULE 608, AS LONG AS WE AVOID ANY TYPE 
OF A MENTION OF A CRIMINAL CASE, WHAT HAPPENED IN THAT 
CRIMINAL CASE, WHAT THE CHARGES WERE, BUT RATHER LOOKED AT 
THE FACTS UNDERLYING. 
THE COURT: BUT HOW DO YOU PROPOSE DOING THAT? 
MR. BLAKELY: SIMPLY ASK HIM IF HE EVER — WHY HE 
WAS LAID OFF FROM -- FROM WHEELWRIGHTS --
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET'S — 
MR. BLAKELY: -- WITH AN ADMONITION TO HIM BY THE 
STATE THAT HE NOT MENTION ANYTHING REGARDING A CRIMINAL CASE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET'S SAY HE DENIES THAT HE 
WAS FIRED FOR EMBEZZLING FUNDS, THEN HOW — WHAT DO YOU DO? 
MR. BLAKELY: THEN WE CAN'T DO ANYTHING MORE. 
MR. LAWRENCE: NOT WITH HIM. 
MR. BLAKELY: NOT WITH HIM. 
THE COURT: WELL, WITH ANYONE. 
MR. BLAKELY: WE COULD CALL THE EMPLOYER. 
THE COURT: WHAT DOES IT MEAN WHEN IT SAYS HERE 
UNDER SUBSECTION 2 THOUGH THAT SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF THE 
CONDUCT OF A WITNESS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTACKING THE 
WITNESS' CREDIBILITY, MAY NOT BE PROVED BY EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE, OTHER THAN CONVICTIONS. 
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WHAT DOES THAT MEAN TO YOU? 
MR. BLAKELY: WELL, YOUR HONOR, IT MEANS TO ME THAT 
BRINGING IN ANY OTHER TYPE OF CRIME. THE — THE DRAFTERS OF 
THIS RULE OF EVIDENCE COULD HAVE SAID OTHER THAN CONVICTIONS. 
THEY DIDN'T SAY THAT. THEY SAID OTHER THAN EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE WHICH CAN COVER MORE THAN CONVICTIONS. 
THE COURT: NOW, THE OTHER QUESTION I HAVE IS YOU'RE 
SAYING THAT IT GOES TO DISHONESTY. 
MR. BLAKELY: RIGHT. 
THE COURT: IF YOU LOOK AT 80 — OR 608, IT DOESN'T 
TALK ABOUT DISHONESTY. THE ONLY TIME DISHONESTY COMES UP IS 
IN 609. 
MR. BLAKELY: TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS. 
THE COURT: YOU THINK THEY MEAN THE SAME? 
MR. BLAKELY: NOT NECESSARILY. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. BLAKELY: NOT NECESSARY; HOWEVER, I DO THINK 
THAT WE HAVE AN INSTANCE HERE OF UNTRUTHFULNESS. 
THE COURT: OKAY. BUT THERE IS A CASE OUT THERE — 
AND I DON'T REMEMBER THE EXACT NAME OF IT BECAUSE I WAS KIND 
OF SURPRISED BY IT -- WHERE AN INDIVIDUAL HAD BEEN CONVICTED 
OF THEFT, A MISDEMEANOR THEFT. THE COURT SAID JUST BECAUSE 
YOU'VE BEEN CONVICTED OF A THEFT DOESN'T EQUATE WITH 
DISHONESTY. 
MR. BLAKELY: TRUE. YOU NEED TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE 
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FACTS UNDERLYING IT. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. AND THAT'S WHY I'M SAYING, JUST 
BECAUSE HE'S BEEN FIRED FOR EMBEZZLEMENT MAY NOT NECESSARILY 
MEAN HE'S UNTRUTHFUL, BUT --
MR. BLAKELY: TRUE. WHAT OCCURRED IN THIS CASE, 
YOUR HONOR, AND LET ME GIVE YOU THE FACTS ON THIS. HE WAS 
WORKING FOR A — 
MR. SAUNDERS: WELL, I'M GOING TO OBJECT TO THIS, 
YOUR HONOR. THE FACTS FROM WHOM? 
THE COURT: WELL, LET — LET ME HEAR HIM OUT. LET 
ME HEAR WHAT HE HAS TO SAY AND THEN YOU'LL — I'LL GIVE YOU A 
CHANCE TO RESPOND. 
MR. BLAKELY: AND, YOUR HONOR, I'M PARAPHRASING THE 
POLICE REPORT THAT I READ ON THIS CASE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. BLAKELY: MR. HARTLEY WAS WORKING — WHAT'S THE 
NAME OF IT? 
MR. LAWRENCE: WHEELWRIGHT. 
MR. BLAKELY: FOR WHEELWRIGHT LUMBER. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. BLAKELY: HE ASSISTED PEOPLE IN GETTING LUMBER 
FROM THE BACK OF THE LUMBER YARD, LOADING IT INTO THEIR 
VEHICLES, TAKING IT TO THEIR HOME, AND THEN DOING 
CONSTRUCTION WORK ON THEIR HOME WITH THE MATERIALS THAT WAS 
OBTAINED THERE. HE DID IT WITHOUT REPAYING WHEELWRIGHT 
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LUMBER FOR THE THINGS THAT WERE TAKEN OUT OF THE BACK OF 
THEIR YARD, WITHOUT NOTIFYING THEM THAT HE WAS DOING THAT 
WORK FOR THESE PEOPLE ON THEIR HOMES. 
WHEN CONFRONTED WITH IT, HE SAID, OH, YES, I HAVE 
RECEIPTS, I SIMPLY CAN'T FIND THEM. DENIED, DENIED, DENIED, 
SEVERAL TIMES. AND THEN FINALLY WHEN HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH 
WHAT THEY HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE PEOPLE THAT HE'D DONE WORK FOR 
THEM, HE FINALLY CONFESSED AND SAID YES, I DID IT, JUST GIVE 
ME A CHANCE TO PAY YOU BACK SO. 
SO THERE WAS SPECIFIC -- SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF 
UNTRUTHFULNESS THERE: NUMBER ONE, BEING UNTRUTHFUL TO THE 
PERSON THAT HE WAS GETTING THE LUMBER FOR AND DOING THE 
PROJECTS FOR; NUMBER TWO, BEING UNTRUTHFUL TO HIS EMPLOYER IN 
WHETHER OR NOT HE'D DONE IT. 
THE COURT: WELL, I GUESS IF YOU WANT TO FIND A CASE 
FOR ME THAT'S RIGHT ON POINT THAT SAYS FIRING SOMEBODY FOR 
EMBEZZLEMENT CONSTITUTES UNTRUTHFULNESS, I'LL CERTAINLY TAKE 
A LOOK AT IT AND RECONSIDER IN THE MORNING. BUT AS IT SITS 
RIGHT NOW, I'M JUST NOT INCLINED TO GRANT IT. I MEAN, 
OTHERWISE IT MAKES SUCH A MOCKERY OUT OF THIS SYSTEM THAT 
SAYS LOOK, THE ONLY WAY YOU CAN ATTACK IS WITH CONVICTIONS 
AND THEY'VE EITHER GOT TO BE FELONIES OR THEY HAVE TO INVOLVE 
ACTS OF DISHONESTY. I MEAN, I THINK IT'S FAIRLY CLEAR FROM 
THE RULES THAT WE -- WE'RE VERY STRICT ABOUT ATTACKING WITH 
SPECIFIC INSTANCES. 
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MR. BLAKELY: UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: AND THAT'S WHAT THIS IS. YOU'RE — YOU 
WANT TO BE ABLE TO ASK HIM WHY HE WAS FIRED FROM HIS 
EMPLOYMENT AND YET THERE'S NO CONVICTION. HAD HE BEEN 
CONVICTED, IT WOULD BE A LOT EASIER. 
MR. BLAKELY: UH-HUH. 
THE COURT: BUT HE HASN'T BEEN. IT'S A PLEA IN 
ABEYANCE, RIGHT? 
MR. BLAKELY: THAT'S CORRECT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. BLAKELY: BUT — BUT THEN IT BRINGS TO QUESTION 
WHY WE HAVE RULE 608(B) IN ADDITION TO RULE 609. 
THE COURT: WELL, 6 -- 608 — 60 9 I THINK IS PRETTY 
CLEAR. 
MR. BLAKELY: RIGHT. 
THE COURT: 608 IS REALLY TALKING ABOUT OPINION AND 
REPUTATION EVIDENCE. DOES HE HAVE A REPUTATION IN THE 
COMMUNITY FOR BEING DISHONEST OR HONEST OR TRUTHFUL? I MEAN, 
YOU CAN PARADE ALL THE WITNESSES YOU WANT FOR THAT QUESTION. 
MR. BLAKELY: OKAY. 
THE COURT: BUT THEN WHEN WE GET DOWN TO SPECIFIC 
CONDUCT UNDER (B), I THINK IT'S VERY NARROW ABOUT WHAT 
SPECIFIC CONDUCT YOU CAN GO INTO. 
SO LET ME HEAR FROM MR. SAUNDERS ON THAT MATTER. 
MR. BLAKELY: OKAY. 
284 
MR. SAUNDERS: YOUR HONOR, I THINK THE COURT'S 
EXACTLY RIGHT THAT IT DOES SEEM TO BE UNFAIR AND I THINK 
THAT'S WHY THE RULE WAS WRITTEN THIS WAY. WHAT IT SAYS IS 
THEY MAY, HOWEVER, IN THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT. 
SO IF YOUR HONOR'S OPINION IS — BASED ON WHAT YOU'VE 
HEARD THAT YOUR FEELING IS THIS SHOULDN'T COME IN, THAT'S 
WITHIN YOUR DISCRETION AND YOU CAN DECIDE — 
THE COURT: WELL, BUT I'LL TELL YOU WHAT I'M 
BOTHERED BY. THERE'S NO QUESTION CERTAINLY THE DEFENSE CAN 
ASK QUESTIONS THAT DISCREDIT HIS CREDIBILITY. I MEAN, 
THAT -- HE'S FAIR GAME, HIS CREDIBILITY IS A BIG ISSUE HERE. 
WHAT I'M CONCERNED ABOUT IS THAT IT'S A PLEA IN ABEYANCE. 
AND I KEEP THINKING THERE'S A FAIRLY RECENT CASE THAT TALKS 
ABOUT HOW WE TREAT PLEA IN ABEYANCE CASES WHEN THEY'RE 
STILL — 
MR. SAUNDERS: THEY'RE NOT CONSIDERED CONVICTIONS. 
THE COURT: — STILL OUT THERE. 
MR. BLAKELY: RIGHT. THEY'RE NOT CONVICTIONS. I 
AGREE, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. AND I'M JUST TRYING TO FIGURE 
OUT WHAT THE RAMIFICATION IS IF HE COMES IN AND ENTERS A PLEA 
IN ABEYANCE AND THERE'S NO CONVICTION, HOW CAN WE THEN 
CIRCUMVENT THAT AND SAY WELL, IT FALLS UNDER 608(B)? AND 
THAT'S — THAT'S WHAT I'M HAVING TROUBLE WITH SO — 
MR. BLAKELY: MY ONLY CONCERN, YOUR HONOR, IS THAT 
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IF WE FIND AN INSTANCE OF SPECIFIC UNTRUTHFUL CONDUCT — 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. BLAKELY: — AND WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER OR NOT 
THERE WERE CRIMINAL CHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH IT, WE WOULDN'T 
THEN BE ABLE TO ASK IT. BECAUSE IF THERE WERE CRIMINAL 
CHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH IT, WE BETTER CHECK AND SEE IF 
THERE'S A CONVICTION. 
DO YOU SEE MY QUANDARY, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: RIGHT. I DO. 
ALL RIGHT. WELL, I'LL -- I'LL TAKE IT UNDER ADVISEMENT 
FOR THE TIME BEING. I MEAN, INITIALLY I THINK I'VE DENIED 
IT, BUT IF YOU WANT TO TAKE A LOOK AND SEE IF THERE'S ANY 
CASE LAW OUT THERE, I'LL CERTAINLY RECONSIDER THE ISSUE. BUT 
AS IT STANDS RIGHT NOW, I'M JUST NOT INCLINED TO LET YOU GO 
INTO THAT. 
MR. BLAKELY: OKAY. AND I — I BELIEVE THERE WAS 
ONE ADDITIONAL MOTION. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. LAWRENCE: THE OTHER THING, YOUR HONOR, I WANT 
TO DO, I WANT TO RENEW — I DID MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL BASED ON 
THE STATEMENTS THAT WERE ALLOWED IN THROUGH THE TAPE, CLOSE 
ENOUGH AKIN TO THE WITNESS TAMPERING OF MR. HARTLEY, AND THE 
VERY SPECIFIC COMMENTS ABOUT THREATENED MY LIFE AND THAT. I 
THINK THE JURY IS TAINTED ON THAT. SO I WOULD ASK FOR A 
MISTRIAL ON THAT BASIS. I THINK YOU HAD RULED, BUT WE WERE 
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(COURT'S RULING) 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WELL, THANK YOU. I — I 
APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL AND ALSO THE BRIEFS THAT 
WERE SUBMITTED. 
AS YOU KNOW, IN ORDER TO GRANT A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
THERE HAS TO BE A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE OUTCOME 
WOULD BE DIFFERENT. AND, FRANKLY, AFTER HEARING THE ARGUMENT 
AND LOOKING AT THE MEMORANDUMS, I JUST DON'T THINK THAT 
THE -- THAT THERE'S A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD HERE THAT THE 
OUTCOME WOULD BE ANY DIFFERENT IF WE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL. I 
MEAN, THE WHOLE CONCEPT IS TO GIVE A DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL. 
NOBODY CAN EVER GET A PERFECT TRIAL. THAT'S — THAT'S JUST 
VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE. AND MY IMPRESSION IS THAT MR. LUCERO 
GOT A FAIR TRIAL IN THIS CASE. 
WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT SOME OF THE ISSUES HERE THAT YOU'VE 
RAISED ABOUT THE C.I., I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY QUESTION 
THAT EVERYBODY IN THIS COURTROOM KNEW THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANT HAD USED DRUGS. BUT I DON'T RECALL ANYBODY REALLY 
PRESSING HIM ABOUT THE TYPE OF DRUG THAT HE WAS USING, 
WHETHER IT WAS MARIJUANA, COCAINE, METHAMPHETAMINE, BUT IT 
WAS CLEAR THAT HE WAS A DRUG USER AT ONE POINT. 
I'M JUST NOT SURE THAT IT MAKES ANY DIFFERENCE IN THIS 
CASE AS TO HOW MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF DRUGS HE WAS USING. 
HE ADMITTED ON THE STAND THAT HE'D USED DRUGS IN THE PAST, HE 
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HAD A DRUG PROBLEM. IN FACT, MY RECOLLECTION WAS THAT THAT'S 
THE REASON HE CAME FORWARD. THAT'S THE REASON HE CONTACTED 
LAW ENFORCEMENT IS HE FELT LIKE HE HAD SOME RESPONSIBILITY TO 
TRY TO HELP CORRECT THE PROBLEM, TO GET RID OF THE PEOPLE WHO 
WERE SELLING DRUGS AND USING DRUGS. AND HE JUST FELT LIKE IT 
WAS HIS TURN AND HIS TIME TO COME FORWARD AND TRY TO DO THIS. 
AND SO I JUST -- I DON'T KNOW THAT THAT REALLY AFFECTS 
HIS CREDIBILITY AS TO HOW MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF DRUGS HE 
WAS USING, AND I JUST DON'T REMEMBER ANYBODY REALLY PRESSING 
HIM HARD AS TO THE TYPE OF DRUG HE WAS USING. 
ON THE QUESTION ABOUT THE — HIS CONVICTION FOR THEFT, 
THE PROBLEM IS THAT AT THE TIME HE TESTIFIED, AT THE TIME OF 
THE TRIAL HE HAD NO CONVICTION FOR THEFT. HE HAD ENTERED A 
GUILTY PLEA, BUT THAT PLEA HAD BEEN HELD IN ABEYANCE BY THE 
COURT SO THERE WAS NO CONVICTION. AND SO WHEN HE GOT ON THE 
WITNESS STAND, HE COULDN'T BE QUESTIONED ABOUT THE 
CONVICTION. THERE WAS JUST NO WAY BECAUSE THERE IS NO 
CONVICTION. 
AND SO NOW, SOME MONTHS LATER WHEN HE MAY HAVE VIOLATED 
THE TERMS OF THAT AGREEMENT AND THE CONVICTION IS ENTERED, IF 
THAT'S TRUE, EVERY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT WHO HAS A 
CONVICTION THAT COMES DOWN AFTER THEY'VE TESTIFIED, WE'D HAVE 
TO SET ASIDE THE CONVICTION AND START ALL OVER AGAIN. BUT AT 
THE TIME HE TESTIFIED -- I THINK THAT'S THE CRITICAL POINT. 
WHEN HE TESTIFIED HE HAD NO FELONY CONVICTION FOR THEFT 
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INVOLVING WHEELWRIGHT LUMBER. 
AND THE OTHER THING IS — I THINK MR. SAUNDERS POINTED 
IT OUT -- EVEN AFTER I HAD SPECIFICALLY RULED THAT HE COULD 
NOT BE QUESTIONED ABOUT THAT CONVICTION, THE DEFENDANT, 
MR. LUCERO, GOT ON THE WITNESS STAND AND BLURTED IT OUT TO 
THE JURY. THIS JURY KNEW FULL WELL THAT THE REASON THE 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT HAD LOST HIS JOB IS BECAUSE HE WAS 
STEALING AT WHEELWRIGHT LUMBER. 
SO DESPITE OUR BEST EFFORTS TO KEEP IT OUT, MR. LUCERO, 
FOR WHATEVER REASON, DECIDED TO LET THE JURY KNOW THAT. SO 
ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, THEY STILL KNEW ABOUT HIM BEING IN 
TROUBLE AT WHEELWRIGHT LUMBER AND WHY HE LOST HIS JOB. 
AND THEN FINALLY ON MR. ACKERMAN, THE REASON -- THERE'S 
NO QUESTION THAT PEOPLE CAN GET ON THE WITNESS STAND AND 
TESTIFY ABOUT SOMEBODY'S CREDIBILITY, BUT THEY'VE GOT TO KNOW 
SOMETHING ABOUT THE PERSON. AND MY RECOLLECTION IS THAT 
MR. ACKERMAN KNEW ABSOLUTELY NOTHING, FIRSTHAND, ABOUT THE 
CREDIBILITY OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, AND SO FOR THAT 
REASON I WASN'T GOING TO ALLOW HIM TO RENDER AN OPINION ABOUT 
SOMEBODY THAT HE REALLY DIDN'T KNOW. 
YEAH, THEY'D WORKED TOGETHER FOR SIX MONTHS, BUT WHEN HE 
WAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED, ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH HIS REPUTATION 
IN THE COMMUNITY FOR BEING TRUTHFUL AND HONEST, I THOUGHT HE 
SAID: I DON'T KNOW. I CAN'T RENDER AN OPINION. 
AND SO I THOUGHT IF THAT'S TRUE, I'M NOT GOING TO LET 
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THIS GUY RENDER ANY KIND OF OPINION IF HE DOESN'T HAVE ANY 
BASIS FOR IT. SO THAT WAS THE REASON THAT I PRECLUDED 
MR. ACKERMAN FROM TESTIFYING IS BECAUSE HE HAD NO PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE AS FAR AS REPUTATION. 
SO FOR ALL OF THOSE REASONS, I'M GOING TO DENY THE 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AT THIS POINT. 
MR. SAUNDERS: WOULD YOU LIKE THE STATE TO PREPARE 
THE FINDINGS? 
THE COURT: YES, WOULD YOU PREPARE AN ORDER TO THAT 
EFFECT. 
(COURT'S RULING CONCLUDES) 
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